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AVOIDABILITY OF FORECLOSURE SALES
UNDER SECTION 548(a)(2) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE: REVISITING THE
TRANSFER ISSUE AND STANDARDIZING
REASONABLE EQUIVALENCY
Vic Sung Lam
Abstract: Federal courts consider the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code to
have conclusively defined "transfer" to include foreclosure sales under section 548(a)(2).
This Comment questions this widely accepted interpretation. Moreover, federal courts
have strongly disagreed on the meaning of "reasonably equivalent value" under section
548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code for the purpose of avoiding a foreclosure sale as a constructive fraudulent transfer. This Comment examines the three dominant but divergent
approaches to determining reasonable equivalency. It concludes that both the Durrett 70percent rule and the Madrid state-procedural approach are inappropriate standards
because they fail to comport with the statutory language and purpose of section 548(a)(2).
This Comment also asserts that a multi-factor analysis analogous to the UCC commercial
reasonableness standard can best achieve the purpose of section 548(a)(2) and balance the
comity concerns between federal and state laws. Finally, it suggests that courts engaging
in such an analysis should not focus exclusively on public sales, but should also inquire
into pre-foreclosure sales efforts commonly accepted as an integral part of a commercially
reasonable disposition.

A bankruptcy trustee may avoid a foreclosure1 sale conducted prior
to a debtor's bankruptcy petition as a constructive fraudulent transfer
under section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.2 To successfully
avoid the sale, the trustee must establish that the foreclosure was a
transfer of the debtor's property for less than a reasonably equivalent
value.3 Congress has provided a definition of "transfer" widely interpreted to encompass foreclosure sales. This Comment, however, questions the popular view by arguing that although a foreclosure may be a
transfer under the current definition of transfer, the debtor's equity
has not been transferred where a statutory right to redeem from the
foreclosure sale exists and remains property of the debtor's estate.
Unlike the term "transfer," Congress has not defined "reasonably
equivalent value," and the meaning of the phrase remains unclear.
This uncertainty has led courts to apply divergent standards to deter1. Foreclosure in this Comment refers to a foreclosure of any kind, including mortgage
foreclosures, deed of trust foreclosures, foreclosures of security interests in personalty, forfeiture
of real estate contracts, and execution sales. For a list of cases applying § 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code to the above types of foreclosures, see THOMAs D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, 116.05, at 16-71 n.6 (rev. ed. 1991).
2. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2)(A), (B)(i) (West Supp. 1993).
3. Id. § 548(a)(2)(A).
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mine the avoidability of foreclosure sales. Within an analytic framework encompassing the statutory language and purpose of section
548(a)(2), this Comment critically evaluates the divergent approaches
to determining reasonable equivalency. It concludes that giving section 548(a)(2) its intended effect requires courts to adopt a multi-factor
commercial reasonableness analysis. It also argues that courts applying the standard should not focus solely on public sales, but should
broaden their inquiry to include commonly-accepted sales efforts as an
integral part of their commercial reasonableness analysis.
I.

THE FRAUDULENT TRANSFER PROVISION AND ITS
PURPOSE

A.

Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code

The fraudulent transfer provision of the Bankruptcy Code, section
548(a), consists of two subsections. Section 548(a)(1) authorizes
avoidance by the trustee in bankruptcy of a transfer of the debtor's
property where actual fraudulent intent is proven. 4 Section 548(a)(2)
provides for avoidance without regard to any actual intent to defraud.5
Although it is possible for a debtor to conspire with a secured creditor
in a foreclosure proceeding to intentionally defraud other creditors,
most foreclosures do not involve actual intent to defraud. In most
cases, foreclosing creditors are merely enforcing their security rights
against a defaulting debtor. As a result, bankruptcy trustees primarily
rely on section 548(a)(2) to invalidate pre-petition foreclosure sales as
constructively fraudulent transfers.6
Section 548(a)(2)(A) and (B)(i) grant a trustee in bankruptcy the
power to avoid a transfer of a debtor's interest in property7 if (1) the
transfer occurred within one year of the debtor's bankcruptcy petition;'
(2) the debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
4. Id. § 548(a)(1).
5. Id. § 548(a)(2).
6. Other statutory bases a bankruptcy trustee may use to avoid foreclosure sales are outside
the scope of this Comment. Two such statutory bases, however, are relevant. The preference
provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West 1979), permits a trustee to avoid
pre-petition transfers that have the effect of preferring one creditor oer others by giving the
favored creditor more than its respective share of the debtor's assets under the bankruptcy law.
Another provision of the Code grants a trustee the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor, 11
U.S.C.A. § 544(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993), of a bona fide purchaser of real property, id.
§ 544(a)(3), and of an actual creditor with an allowable unsecured claim, I1 U.S.C.A. § 544(b)
(West 1979), to avoid transfers voidable under applicable nonbankruptcy law or state law. See
CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 1,
16.02, .03.
7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a) (West Supp. 1993).
8. Id.
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exchange for the transfer;9 and (3) the debtor was insolvent at the time
of the transfer or became insolvent as a result of the transfer.10
Judicial interpretations of this section have given rise to controversies over when a "transfer" occurs with respect to foreclosure sales
and over the meaning of "reasonably equivalent value." Despite the
general agreement now on the transfer issue, the meaning of "reasonably equivalent value" still remains the focus of sharp disagreement
among the federal circuits.
B.

The Equity-ProtectingPurpose of Section 548(a)(2)

The purpose of section 548 is to preserve bankrupt debtors' estates
for fair distribution to all creditors.1" In the context of foreclosure
sales, the purpose of section 548(a)(2) becomes to preserve the debtors'
equity in foreclosed properties. 2 While discussions of the transfer
issue seldom refer to this statutory purpose, discussions of reasonable
equivalency often do. Despite the consensus on and the frequent reference to the purpose of section 548(a)(2), courts strongly disagree on
what the statutory language of "reasonably equivalent value" ought to
mean to serve the statutory purpose and have reached divergent conclusions regarding the appropriate standard for determining reasonable equivalency. It becomes imperative then to be mindful of the
commonly agreed statutory purpose when considering the issues and
the differing views.
II. REVISITING THE TRANSFER ISSUE UNDER SECTION
548(a)(2)
The transfer issue is important since courts need not determine the
issue of reasonably equivalent value if a foreclosure sale does not constitute a transfer. As originally enacted in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code
9. Id. § 548(a)(2)(A).
10. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i).
11. See Grissom v. Johnson (In re Grissom), 955 F.2d 1440, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the purpose of § 548 is to prevent depletion of bankruptcy estates); Barrett v.
Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20, 23-24 (3d Cir. 1991); Bundles v. Baker
(In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that the purpose is to "preserve the
assets of the [bankruptcy] estate"); Henry-Luqueer Properties, Inc. v. Mayo (In re HenryLuqueer Properties, Inc.), 145 B.R. 771, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that the purpose is to
"foster an equitable distribution of the debtor's property"); Ruebeck v. Attleboro Sav. Bank (In
re Ruebeck), 55 B.R. 163, 168 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) ("[IThe pervading intent.., behind the
Bankruptcy Code... is equitable distribution.").
12. This purpose entails reasonably maximizing foreclosure sale prices so that debtors' estates
do not suffer unreasonable depletion through loss of debtors' equity in foreclosure sales. See BFP
v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing the
objective of § 548(a)(2) as "price-maximizing").
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did not explicitly define "transfer" to include foreclosures. As a result,
some courts held that a foreclosure sale did not constitute a transfer

because the only transfer occurred at the time the security interest13

such as a mortgage or a deed of trust was perfected Lnder state law.
Under this one-transfer approach, if the date of perfection of a security
interest fell outside the one-year period, the foreclosure sale would be
beyond the reach of section 548(a)(2), thus eliminating the need to
determine if the transfer was for a reasonably equivalent value.14
However, federal courts now deem the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (the 1984 Amendments)15 to have
overruled the one-transfer approach 6 and to have resolved the "transfer controversy." 7 According to this widely accepted two-transfer
view, a transfer occurs both at the time of perfection and at the time of

foreclosure sale.
In spite of overruling the one-transfer view, the 1984 Amendments
may not have resolved the transfer issue. One may still plausibly
13. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir.
1984) [hereinafter Madrid I1]; see also Alsop v. State (In re Alsop), 22 B.R. 1017, 1018 (D.
Alaska 1982).
14. Section 548(a) has a one-year statute of limitation. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a) (West Supp.
1993).
15. BAFJA, commonly known as the 1984 Amendments, amended the definition of transfer
in § 101 to encompass the "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption," and also amended
§ 548(a) to explicitly include both voluntary and involuntary transfers. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(54)
(West 1993), 548(a) (West Supp. 1993); Verna v. Dorman (In re Verna), 58 B.R. 246, 250
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
16. Ehring v. Western Community Moneycenter (In re Ehring), 900 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir.
1990) (conceding that the 1984 Amendments overruled its ruling on the transfer issue in Madrid
I); General Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 B.R. 124, 129-30 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1987); Verna, 58 B.R. at 251; Ruebeck v. Attleboro Sav. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 B.R.
163, 167 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985). The scripted colloquy inserted into the Congressional Record
after the enactment of the 1984 Amendments, in which Senator Robert Dole tells Senator Dennis
DeConcini that the 1984 Amendments have no bearing on "the Durrettissue," 130 CONG. REC.
S13771-72 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984), is not appropriate authority in judicial decision making. See
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (stating that the authoritative source for finding
legislative intent lies in the Committee Reports rather than the "snippets" of individual
members); see also Ruebeck, 55 B.R. at 167 n.5 (stating that post-enactment statements are not
appropriate authority).
17. See Ehring, 900 F.2d at 187; GeneralIndus., 79 B.R. at 129-30; Ruebeck, 55 B.R. at 167.
The conspicuous lack of discussion of the transfer issue in recent cases strongly indicates a trend
disfavoring the one-transfer view. See Grissom v. Johnson (In re Grissom), 955 F.2d 1440, 1443
(11th Cir. 1992) (assuming transfer without discussion although perfection almost certainly
occurred some 18 years prior to the bankruptcy petition); BFP v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n (In
re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 1992). See generally Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1991); Henry-Luqueer Properties, Inc. v. Mayo (In re
Henry-Luqueer Properties, Inc.), 145 B.R. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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argue that a transfer resulting in the loss of a debtor's equity interest18
does not actually occur at the foreclosure sale but occurs at the time
the applicable state statutory redemption period has run. 19 This argument is limited, however, in that the statutory right to redeem is not
available in all states. Even in those states with a statutory right to
redeem,20 the right is not available to all debtors or for all types of
foreclosures.2 1 Nevertheless, if a statutory right to redeem is available
to a debtor, the right may become property of the debtor's estate
under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.2 2 Once property of the
estate, the trustee may exercise the right to redeem or sell it to willing
buyers under section 363(b)(1) of the Code,2 3 thereby precluding the
loss of the debtor's equity interest. Thus, the debtor's equity in the
foreclosed property is not transferred at the foreclosure sale but
remains property of the estate in the form of a statutory right to
redeem for the duration of the statutory redemption period.24 Under
this three-transfer view, the relevant transfer for purposes of section
548(a)(2) is the forfeiture of the debtor's equity upon the expiration or
termination of the statutory redemption period. The transfer at the
foreclosure sale does not forfeit the debtor's equity and becomes inconsequential in view of the equity-protecting purpose of section
548(a)(2). This three-transfer view is consistent with the statutory definition of transfer. Although the phrase "foreclosure of the debtor's
equity of redemption" in the definition of transfer" arguably refers to
termination of equitable redemption rather than statutory redemp18. The equity interest here means the extra value of the property in excess of the foreclosure
sale price.
19. The statutory right to redeem foreclosed property allows the mortgagor or other
redeeming party to regain possession and ownership if the redeeming party pays the foreclosure
sale purchaser the foreclosure sale price and all related costs within the statutorily prescribed
period. See CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 1, 8.08[3][g], at 8-45.

20. For a list ofjurisdictions that allow the statutory right of redemption, see id. I 8.08[3][g],
at 8-46 n.108.
21. Id. %8.08[3][g], at 8-46. "[IThe availability of the statutory right to redeem varies
significantly from state to state depending on such factors as the amount of the debt, the type of
real estate, and whether a deficiency judgment has been obtained." Id
22. Id. f 13.04[1], at 13-19 n.28.
23. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b)(1) (West 1993). In fact, the trustee may have a duty to dispose of
the right to redeem in a way compatible with the best interest of the parties in interest. See id.
§ 704(I) (West Supp. 1993).
24. The redemption period ranges from three months to one year. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 729.030 (West Supp. 1993); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3240(3)-(5) (West 1987);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-4 (West 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.23.020 (West Supp.
1993). Note that the running of a redemption period may be tolled by § 108, or arguably by the
automatic stay of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. See CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 1,
13.04[l], at 13-19.

25. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(54) (West 1993).
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tion,2 6 Congress is unlikely to have intended the phrase to limit the
meaning of transfer, especially in light of the entire definition of transfer.27 The broad and all-inclusive definition of transfier should include
the actual forfeiture of the debtor's equity interest at the time the statutory redemption period expires.
The argument for the three-transfer view is persuasive, but courts
apparently have not ruled on its merits yet. If accepted, the threetransfer view can have a significant impact on actions brought under
section 548(a)(2). Under the three-transfer view, the relevant transfer
for purposes of section 548(a)(2) does not occur for as long as three
months to over a year after the foreclosure sale, depending on the
length and tolling of the statutory redemption period. Thus, a threetransfer rule may have the effect of preventing a trustee from bringing
an action under section 548(a)(2) for many months after the foreclosure sale. Courts should take this delaying effect into consideration in
determining the merits of the three-transfer view.
III.

CURRENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF
REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE

Unlike the term transfer, Congress has not defined "reasonably
equivalent value" in the Code,28 leaving the responsibility of defining
the term to the courts.2 9 Three distinct approaches to interpreting
"reasonably equivalent value" have developed. The first approach, the
Durrett70-percent rule, focuses on the foreclosure sale price measured
against a benchmark percentage of the fair market value established by
appraisals, or the appraised value, of a foreclosed property. The second approach, the Madrid state-procedural rule, focuses on compliance with state foreclosure procedures. The third approach, the
Bundles multi-factor analysis, examines all relevant factors surrounding the sale in view of some equitable or commercially reasonable
standard.
26. Equitable redemption refers to redemption prior to a foreclosare sale while statutory
redemption refers to redemption after the sale. CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 1, 8.08[3][g], at
8-44.
27. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(54) (West 1993).
28. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 1988). A proposal to the
1984 Amendments granting an irrebuttable presumption of reasonably equivalent value to any
mortgagee or third-party purchaser who purchases mortgaged property at a regularly conducted,
non-collusive foreclosure sale for a price equal to the full amount of the mortgage debt, was not
enacted. Verna v. Dorman (In re Verna), 58 B.R. 246, 250 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). The final
version of BAFJA did not define "reasonably equivalent value," nor did it provide any guidance
for the courts to follow in interpreting the phrase.
29. Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 23, 23 (3d Cir. 1991).
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A.

The Durrett 70-PercentRule: A Numerical-Ratio Litmus Test
for Reasonable Equivalency

In bringing foreclosure sales under the ambit of section 548(a)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co.30 has been attributed by some with
establishing a 70-percent litmus test for determining reasonably
equivalent value. In Durrett, a debtor executed a promissory note
secured by a deed of trust.3 1 The debtor defaulted on the note after
servicing the debt for over seven years.3 2 Pursuant to the power of
sale clause contained in the deed of trust, the trustee sold the property
at a foreclosure sale for 57.7 percent ($115,400) of the admitted fair
market value ($200,000). 33 Nine days after the sale, the debtor filed a
petition in bankruptcy and sought to invalidate the sale as a fraudulent
conveyance under section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act.34 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied
relief.35 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court decision and held that the foreclosure sale was not a fair exchange for
equivalent value and constituted a fraudulent transfer. 36 The Fifth
Circuit also noted that it had not been able to locate any judicial decision that approved a transfer of real property for less than 70 percent
of the market value.3 7 As a result of this dictum, Durrett has been
said to represent the proposition that a foreclosure sale for less than 70
percent of the fair market value is not a sale for reasonably equivalent
value under section 548(a)(2). 38 According to this approach attributed to Durrett, the sale price realized at a foreclosure sale measured
against the appraised fair market value of the property is the sole
determining factor. This approach, more accurately described as the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id. at 202-03
Id. at 202 n.1. Section 67(d) is the predecessor of § 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 460 F. Supp. 52, 54 (N.D. Tex. 1978), vacated, 621

F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
36. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203.

37. Id.
38. Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983, 986 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1989). The 70-percent benchmark does not appear to be a hard and fast rule in practice. See,
ag., infra note 39. But see Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Barrett), 104
B.R. 688, 692 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (avoiding a foreclosure sale for 69.5 percent of the market
value), vacated and remanded, 111 B.R. 78 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v.
Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (applying the 70-percent rule
mechanically); Berge v. Sweet (In re Berge), 33 B.R. 642, 649-50 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983).
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numerical-ratio approach, has developed a followiag at the lower
court level.3 9
B.

The Madrid State-ProceduralApproach: Substituting Compliance
with State ForeclosureProceduresfor Reasonable
Equivalency

The second approach, first outlined by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Lawyer's Title Insurance Corp. v. Madrid
(Madrid1),4 does not consider the foreclosure price at all, but instead
focuses on whether a foreclosure sale complies with the applicable
state foreclosure procedures. Under this approach, a court will conclusively presume that a non-collusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sale yields a reasonably equivalent value.
Madrid I involved a non-judicial, pre-petition fore.losure sale similar to the one in Durrett.4 The bankruptcy court found that the sale
was conducted properly in accordance with the state law, but that the
sale price was 64 percent to 67 percent of the fair market value at the
time of sale.42 Following the Durrett 70-percent rule, the court invalidated the foreclosure sale.4 3 On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel for the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Durrettrule, reasoning that "a regularly conducted sale, open to all bidders and all creditors, is itself a safeguard against the evils of private transfers to
relatives and favorites."' The Appellate Panel stated that "[t]he law
of foreclosure should be harmonized with the law of fraudulent conveyances," and that harmonization could be best achieved by equating
the reasonably equivalent value requirement of section 548(a)(2) with
the sale price realized at a non-collusive and regularly conducted fore39. See, eg., Brasby v. Joseph C. Perry, Inc. (In re Brasby), 109 B.R. 113, 125 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1990); Orsa Assoc., Inc. v. MBA Fin., Inc. (In re Orsa Assoc.), 99 B.R. 609, 615-18 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Corbett, 80 B.R. 32, 37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); Smith v. American
Consumer Fin. Corp. (Inre Smith), 21 B.R. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); Perdido Bay Country
Club Estates v. Equitable Trust Co. (In re Perdido Bay Country Club Estates), 23 B.R. 36
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Jones v. Home Life Ins. Co. (In re Jones), 20 B.R. 988, 993 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1982); Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 B.R. 832 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1982).
40. 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Madrid1],
aff'd on other grounds,Madrid
11 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
41. See id. at 425.
42. Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce Co., 10 B.R. 795, 800 (Bank. D. Nev. 1981), rev'd,
Madrid I, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on othergrounds, Madrid II, 725 F.2d 1197
(9th Cir.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
43. Id. at 800-01.
44. Madrid I, 21 B.R. at 426-27.
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closure sale.45 Based on this reasoning, the Appellate Panel reversed
the bankruptcy court's decision and upheld the foreclosure sale."
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has since expressed its approval
of Madrid I's reasoning in dicta. 47 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, gave Madrid I its latest boost and explicitly
adopted the state-procedural approach in BFP v. Imperial Savings &
Loan Ass'n (In re BFP).48 The Ninth Circuit's holding in BFP irrebuttably presumes a foreclosure sale to be a transfer for a reasonably
equivalent value if the sale was non-collusive and regularly conducted
in accordance with state foreclosure procedures. 49 This approach
equates state procedural requirements with reasonably equivalent
value for purposes of section 548. Under this approach, absent collusion, intentional fraud, or violation of state foreclosure procedures, a
foreclosure sale will withstand a challenge under section 548(a)(2)
even if the price realized falls substantially below the fair market value
of the property foreclosed.
C

The Bundles Multi-factor Analysis: Considering the Totality of
Circumstances in Determining Reasonable Equivalency

Dissatisfaction with both the Durrett 70-percent rule and the
Madrid state-procedural approach became evident when the Eighth
Circuit refused to adopt either standard and instead required a caseby-case evidentiary determination of reasonably equivalent value.5
The Seventh Circuit provided the most well-recognized formulation of
this case-by-case approach5 ' in Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles).5 2 In
Bundles, the Seventh Circuit, after examining the two approaches in
Madrid I and Durrett, concluded that both lines of authority were
unsatisfactory, 3 and held that a court should consider the totality of
the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. 4 Under this approach, a
45. Id. at 427. This approach functionally precludes consideration of the issue of adequacy of
the consideration (reasonable equivalency under § 548(a)(2)). Id. at 428 (Volinn, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 427. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Appellate Panel's decision but on the ground
that the foreclosure was not a transfer. Madrid ii, 725 F.2d at 1199.
47. See In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 (6th Cir. 1985).
48. 974 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1992).
49. Id. at 1149.
50. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Bismark v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). The Hulm court rejected the state-procedural approach
and conspicuously ignored Durrett,
51. See BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148 n.5 (explicitly acknowledging Bundles formulation as the most
well recognized).
52. 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
53. Id. at 819-21.
54. Id. at 824.
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court may grant a presumption, rebuttable by the trustee, that the
price realized at a regularly conducted foreclosure sale represents a
reasonably equivalent value, and the court must examine all relevant
factors including the sale price, whether the appraised fair market
value was fair, whether the bidding at the sale was competitive, and
whether the property was advertised widely."5 This multi-factor
approach with its improved variants56 has been widely accepted
among the circuits,57 and appeared to be the recent trend until the
Ninth Circuit revitalized the Madrid I approach in BFP.
To date, all federal circuits except the Second, Tenth and D.C. Circuits have spoken on the issue of reasonably equivalent value under
section 548(a)(2). Most circuits have adopted the Bundles multi-factor analysis either explicitly5" or implicitly. 9 The Sixth and Ninth
Circuits have adopted the Madrid state-procedural approach.' The
Fifth Circuit has not addressed the issue of reasonable equivalency
directly since Durrett, but seemed to imply in FederalDeposit Insurance Corp. v. Blanton6 1 a less mechanical approach than the Durrett
70-percent rule.6 2
55. Id. Although the Bundles court did not articulate the standard for considering the
relevant factors of a foreclosure sale, it implicitly adopted the commercial reasonableness
standard by citing cases that explicitly adopted the standard. See id.
56. Judge Queenan, in General Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 B.R. 124,
132-33 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987), suggested a controlling standard of "commercial
reasonableness" for considering the relevant factors, drawing analogy to the UCC. Judge
Malugen, in Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983, 991 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1989), formulated a three-pronged procedure for the multi-factor analysis based on the
commercial reasonableness standard: a court should (1) determine whether the foreclosure sale
was non-collusive and properly conducted in accordance with state law; (2) examine all
"circumstances surrounding the sale to determine whether commercially reasonable steps were
taken to achieve the best price;" and (3) review the price realized at the sale if and only if the
court finds that the foreclosing creditor failed to take commercially reasonable steps to achieve
the best forced sale price.
57. See, eg., Grissom v. Johnson, 955 F.2d 1440, 1445-47 (11th Cir. 1992); Barrett v.
Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20, 23-25 (3d Cir. 1991); Cooper v. Ashley
Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications), 914 F.2d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 1990);
Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823-24; First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismark v. Huhm (In re Hulm),
738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir. 1984).
58. See Grissom, 955 F.2d at 1445 (11th Cir.); Barrett,939 F.2d at 23-25 (3d Cir.); Cooper
914 F.2d at 466 (4th Cir.); Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824-25 (7th Cir.).
59. See Hulm, 738 F.2d at 327 (8th Cir.); Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d
978, 981-82 (1st Cir. 1983).
60. See BFP v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1148-49 (9th Cir.
1992); In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1138-40 (6th Cir. 1985).
61. 918 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1990).
62. See id at 531 n.7.
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IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT APPROACHES TO
DETERMINING REASONABLE EQUIVALENCY

Assuming that a foreclosure sale is a transfer,6 3 courts must look
into the issue of reasonable equivalency. The current three-way split
among the circuits epitomizes their differing views on the relative
importance of the federal interest in preserving debtors' equity on the
one hand, and the traditional state interest in determining property
rights on the other. A satisfactory resolution of the disagreement
must adequately address the valid concerns courts have shown in
reaching their divergent decisions.
The first step in resolving the disagreement is to establish an analytic framework for evaluating the respective merits of the three
approaches. In the context of interpreting "reasonably equivalent
value" under section 548(a)(2), three criteria are important: (1) an
acceptable standard must comport with the statutory purpose of section 54 8 ;14 (2) it must also be consistent with the statutory language of
the section;6 5 and (3) it must not unduly interfere with the traditional
state areas of regulation." These criteria capture the valid concerns
expressed by the various courts and embody the substantive underpinnings for the different approaches.
A.

Durrett Should Be Recognized for FirstAcknowledging a
FederalRight of Redemption Under Section 548(a)(2)
Rather Than Establishinga Rigid and Arbitrary 70PercentRule Inconsistent with the Statutory
Language and Purpose of Section 548

The purpose of section 548 is to protect debtors' equity for fair distribution to all creditors. 67 Whether a rigid 70-percent rule can adequately serve this equity-protecting purpose remains doubtful. Courts
63. For a discussion of the transfer issue, see supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (indicating the widespread consensus on

the statutory purpose of § 548).
65. See Norfolk &W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1156, 1163 (1991)
(indicating that statutory interpretation begins with statutory language); Bundles v. Baker (In re
Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 822-23 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that courts' duty is to simply interpret
the language of the statute); Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983,
989 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) (stating that any analysis of § 548(a) must begin with the clear
language of the statute).
66. BFP v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 1992); cf
Madrid I, 21 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (arguing that the state law of foreclosure
should be harmonized with the federal law of fraudulent conveyances), aff'd on other grounds,
Madrid II, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
67. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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applying the Durrett 70-percent rule rely on appraisals submitted by
the parties to each case.6" This appraisal-based valuation is problematic for at least two reasons. First, methods of appraisal are not an
exact science and rely on many assumptions. Appraisals of residential
properties are commonly based on comparable sales, but some types of
property such as many commercial properties simply lack comparable
sales. These appraisals are often based on questionable assumptions
and can vary widely depending on the individual appraisers. Second,
even appraisals based on the so-called comparable sales fail to take
into consideration the forced nature, the liquidity :requirement, and
other price-reducing characteristics of foreclosure sales. 69 The extent
to which these price-suppressing characteristics affect the value of the
foreclosed property depends on the time, place, economic conditions,
and particular circumstances involved. Absent any evidence that the
price-reducing characteristics consistently account fbr about 30 percent of the appraised market value, the 70-percent benchmark is arbitrary. The tenuous appraisals coupled with the arbitrary 70-percent
benchmark render the Durrett 70-percent rule a shot-in-the-dark
approach to determining reasonable equivalency and thus to accomplishing the equity-protecting purpose of the statute. In practice, the
rule subjects both creditors and debtors to appraisal risk and creates
inequity. On the one hand, a court may avoid a well-run foreclosure
sale which achieved the true market value of the collateral given the
market conditions, but the sale price happened to fa.ll short of the 70percent benchmark. On the other hand, the rule may fail to protect
much of the debtor's equity in cases where the sale price fell far short
of the true realizable market value, but happened to be slightly above
the 70-percent benchmark. Thus, blindly applying this numerical
formula to complex factual situations without any regard for the
accompanying circumstances inevitably creates inequity and cannot
effectively serve the purpose of section 548.
68. Each party presumably pursues its own best interests in submitting appraisals. Usually,
courts choose some average of the often different appraisals as the fidr market value. Some
courts following the Durrett 70-percent rule believe this method of valuation is fair and not
particularly difficult. See, eg., Brasby v. Joseph C. Perry, Inc. (In re Brasby), 109 B.R. 113,
124-25 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
69. Foreclosure sales involve liquidation of collateral in a relatively short period of time.
They generally require all-cash payment from third-party purchasers, and also lack proper title
at the time of payment. See Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent
Conveyances: Accommodating State and FederalObjectives, 71 VA. L. Rav. 933, 978-79 (1985).
These characteristics inevitably suppress sale prices to a level below those so-called comparable,
fully negotiated transactions. See Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 B.R. 163,
170 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (indicating that a foreclosure sale price falls short of the fair market
value even under the best of conditions).

Avoidability of Foreclosure Sales
Not only is a rigid 70-percent rule unable to effectively achieve the
statutory purpose of protecting debtors' equity, it also fails to comport
with the statutory language of section 548(a)(2). Congress has chosen
the words "reasonably equivalent value" to express its intended standard rather than fixing a numerical formula.7" Such statutory language indicates that courts need to examine more factors than just the
sale price measured against an arbitrary numerical benchmark."
Thus, a rigid 70-percent rule oversimplifies the requirements of the
statutory language.
More importantly, the Fifth Circuit probably did not intend its
"purest form of dicta"7 2 in Durrettto become a rigid 70-percent rule.7 3
In fact, the Fifth Circuit recently indicated its unwillingness to adopt
any rigid percentage rule in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Blanton.7 4 Thus, the so-called Durrett 70-percent rule is probably a mere
creation of some lower courts and commentators and certainly lacks
substantive merits as a legal rule. Rather than establishing a rigid 70percent rule, Durrett should be recognized as breaking new ground by
first acknowledging a federal right of redemption in non-collusive foreclosure sales75 because the constructive fraudulent transfer provision
indeed provides a de facto one-year redemption period within which
debtors may recover their foreclosed property if they did not receive a
reasonably equivalent value for their property. 6
B.

The Madrid State-ProceduralApproach Does Not Comport with
the Statutory Language of Section 548(a)(2) and Strips
Section 548(a)(2) of Its Intended Effects

While a rigid 70-percent rule represents an implausible attempt to
serve the purpose of section 548, the Madrid state-procedural
approach actually undermines the very purpose of the provision. The
approach replaces the federal standard of reasonable equivalency with
70. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1993). Had Congress intended merely a
numerical definition for "reasonably equivalent value," it could have simply provided a
percentage in the statute.
71. See Grissom v. Johnson, 955 F.2d 1440, 1445 (11th Cir. 1992) ("There is no simple
mathematical test which adequately substitutes for [the] required analysis of all important facts.
...Congress did not intend to make a fixed percentage dispositive of reasonable equivalence.").
72. Id. at 1444.
73. To date, the Fifth Circuit has not acknowledged a rigid 70-percent rule many have
attributed to its decision in DurretL
74. See 918 F.2d 524, 531 n.7 (5th Cir. 1990).
75. See William H. Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal
Property Foreclosures: Some ProposedModifications, 63 N.C. L. REv. 257, 265-66 (1985).
76. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
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the state procedural standards for proper foreclosure sales, 7 7 effectively limiting all federal inquiry to examining compliance with state
foreclosure procedures and precluding any examination of the value of
the property foreclosed upon. 8 Such a substitution makes sense only
if the federal and state standards substantively coincide. However, the
state procedures generally do not comport with the price-maximizing
objective of the federal statute. 9 In fact, most current state foreclosure procedures are inadequate for maximizing prices and are "in
drastic need of upgrading." 80 Until state procedures can achieve the
same substantive goal as the federal standard, equating the two for the
purpose of section 548(a)(2) is not appropriate.
The Madrid state-procedural approach also renders section
548(a)(2) redundant. Under this approach, trustees can avoid foreclosure sales for collusion or failure to comply with state procedures, but
they can already do so under other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. Specifically, sections 548(a)(1) and 558 permit avoidance for
collusion."
Sections 544(b) and 558 permit avoidance allowable
under applicable state law for failure to comply with state foreclosure
procedures.8 2 Thus, the state-procedural approach renders section
548(a)(2) duplicative of existing bankruptcy provisions and amounts

to interpreting section 548(a)(2) out of existence, depriving bank77. See BFP v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 1992)
(irrebuttably presuming reasonable equivalency for non-collusive foreclasure sales conducted in
compliance with state law).
78. See Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 B.R. 163, 167 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1985) (pointing out that the Madrid approach proscribes factual inquiry into reasonable
equivalency).
79. See General Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 D.R. 124, 131-32 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1987) (stating that state procedures are not designed to maximize foreclosure sale
prices).
80. Ehrlich, supra note 69, at 961-62. State foreclosure procedures are based on the archaic
assumption that publicly held auctions can realize the market price for a foreclosed property.
This might have been true in times when towns were small and news of foreclosure sale could be
easily disseminated to interested parties. However, modem society has changed substantially,
and selling one's property on the courthouse doorsteps is no longer an effective way to realize the
true market value of property. See id. The most recent empirical study confirms the inadequacy
of state foreclosure procedures to achieve satisfactory prices and further indicates that such
inadequacy hurts both the mortgagor and the mortgagee. See Steven Wechsler, Through the
Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of
Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 884 (1985).
81. Section 548(a)(1) applies to a collusion involving the debtor as a colluding party, see 11
U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993), while § 558 applies to a collusion by others against the
debtor's interest, see id. § 558 (formerly § 541(e) prior to the 1984 Amendments).
82. Under § 544(b), the trustee asserts the rights of an actual creditor with an allowable
unsecured claim to avoid a sale. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West 1979). Under § 558, the trustee
asserts the defenses of the debtor to avoid a sale. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West Supp. 1993).
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ruptcy trustees of an independent federal cause of action under that
section.
In addition to undermining the statutory purpose, the Madridstateprocedural approach fails to comport with the statutory language of
section 548(a)(2). Section 548(a)(2) does not make any distinction
between sales that comply with state law and those that do not.8 3
Congress clearly did not legislate an irrebuttable presumption of rea84
sonable equivalency for sales that merely complied with state law.
To judicially create such a presumption is inappropriate. 85 The role of
the judiciary is to interpret the language of the statute8 6 and "give
effect to congressional will, however ambiguous its manifestation." 8 7
Congress' conscious use of a federal standard is not ambiguous and
indicates its unwillingness to rely on state procedures to protect the
federal interest in equitable distribution of debtors' assets. 88 Thus,
interpreting section 548(a)(2) to dispense with an independent federal
assessment of reasonable equivalency 89 ignores congressional will,
effectively shields inadequately conducted foreclosures from judicial
scrutiny under section 548(a)(2), and thereby severely undermines the
ability of trustees to recover lost equity. 90
Despite the apparent problems with the Madrid state-procedural
approach, the Ninth Circuit in BFP v. ImperialSavings & Loan Ass'n
(In re BFP),91 the most recent support for this approach, argued that
market stability and comity concerns for traditional state areas of regulation compelled the adoption of the approach. 92 While the concerns
are legitimate, the court's reasoning is flawed. In attacking the Bundles multi-factor analysis as upsetting market stability, the Ninth Cir83. See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 821 (7th Cir. 1988).
84. Id A proposed amendment to § 548 adopting such an irrebuttable standard was deleted
from the 1984 Amendments. See supra note 28. This indicates that Congress was not willing to
adopt such a standard.
85. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982) (stating that the role of the judiciary
does not extend to imposing its will over congressional choice of policy).
86. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823.
87. Id. at 822.
88. Id. at 824.
89. Id. at 821.
90. Since the great majority of foreclosure sales are non-collusive and regularly conducted
according to minimal state requirements, the approach effectively creates a wholesale exemption
for these often poorly conducted foreclosure sales. See Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20, 24 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991); Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823; Lindsay v. Beneficial
Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983, 990 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989).
91. 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992).
92. See id. at 1148-49. Unlike BFP, Madrid I offered much scantier arguments for the
approach, and merely implied the comity concerns. Madrid I, 21 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982).
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cuit relied on Professor Scott B. Ehrlich's criticisms directed at the
Durrett approach in practice, not at the Bundles approach. 9 3 Examination of Professor Ehrlich's article reveals that he concurs with the
widely held view that the current inadequate state foreclosure procedures render the Madrid state-procedural approach inappropriate.94
In fact, he even suggests that courts continue putting pressure on the
states until they "revamp" their foreclosure procedures. 95
The Ninth Circuit also raised the comity issue of giving due regard
to traditional state areas of regulation. 96 The court, however, misapplied the comity principle in its pre-emption analysis to justify the
Madrid state-procedural approach. The recent Supreme Court decision, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Ina,9 7 cited by the Ninth Circuit in
support of its position,98 expressly recognized congressional purpose
as the " 'touchstone' of pre-emption analysis." 99 The congressional
purpose for section 548(a)(2) clearly encompasses creating an
independent federal cause of action."0 0 The Madrid state-procedural
approach, however, strips section 548(a)(2) of its independent cause of
action by equating reasonable equivalency with state procedural
requirements and by precluding independent federal determination of
reasonable equivalency.10 1 According to the Supreme Court, such a
conflict with congressional purpose constitutes sufficient grounds for
pre-empting state procedures. 0 2 To the extent pre-empted, the state
foreclosure procedures should be "without effect" for purposes of section 548(a)(2).
93. See BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148-49 (criticizing the Bundles approach as an untenable and ad
hoc approach that produces intolerable uncertainty and undermines price-maximizing objectives,
citing Professor Ehrlich's article). But see Ehrlich, supra note 69, at 963-64. Professor Ehrlich
pointed out that virtually every case that has followed Durretthas in practice engaged in case-bycase factual analysis rather than applying a rigid 70-percent rule. See id at 963 n.89. According
to Professor Ehrlich, the Durrett line rather than the Bundles line of case-by-case analyses is
actually untenable and ad hoc. See id at 963-65.
94. See Ehrlich, supra note 69, at 966 (stating that MadridI is valid only if state procedures
are adequate); id at 975 (concluding that state procedures are woefully inadequate).
95. See id at 967. The most recent empirical study indicates that stzte foreclosure procedures
have also failed to achieve their own intended results of competitive bidding and fair prices. See
Wechsler, supra note 80, at 852, 884.
96. See BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149.
97. 112 S.Ct. 2608 (1992).
98. See BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149.
99. Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2617 (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978)).
100. See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 823 (7th Cir. 1988); see also General
Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 B.R. 124, 131 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)
(arguing courts must take the statute at face value as intending to cover all foreclosures).
101. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
102. See Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2617 (declaring that any state law that conflicts with federal
law is "without effect") (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)).
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The pre-emption issue becomes increasingly important in view of
the states' willingness to compromise the purpose of section 548(a)(2)
by adopting the MadridI formulation of reasonable equivalency in the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).1 03 As the majority of
states have adopted UFTA at the expense of the purpose of section

548(a)(2), 1°0 federal courts must not fail to adequately protect the fed-

eral interests under section 548(a)(2) by misjudging the relative importance of the pre-empting federal statute and due regard for state
regulations.10 5
C.

The Bundles Multi-FactorAnalysis Gives Section 548(a)(2) Its
Intended Effects and Balances Comity Concerns

The Bundles multi-factor analysis, which takes into consideration
all relevant facts of a foreclosure sale in determining reasonable

equivalency, represents the most sensible approach to the issue of reasonable equivalency. First, this approach permits federal courts to
independently examine foreclosure sales to ensure achieving the
equity-protecting purpose of section 548(a)(2). 106 Second, the
approach has sufficient flexibility to allow courts to accord due regard

for state and local interests in individual cases."0 7 Third, the statutory
language of "reasonably equivalent value" implies judicial inquiry into

reasonableness of foreclosure sales in light of both the statutory purpose' °s and particular circumstances. 10 9 Courts cannot adequately

determine reasonableness of foreclosures without making a factual
inquiry into all the relevant factors of a case. In short, the Bundles
multi-factor analysis comports with the purpose and language of section 548(a)(2) and permits courts to balance comity concerns. More103. See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 3(b) 7A U.L.A. 650 (1985). The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, after heated debate, adopted the MadridI
formulation to counteract the "Durrett problem," the perceived encroachment by § 548(a)(2)
upon state regulation of foreclosures. For a detailed discussion of the UFTA, see Peter A. Alces
& Luther M. Dorr, Jr., A CriticalAnalysisof the New Uniform Fraudulent TransferAct, 1985 U.
ILL. L. REv. 527 (1985).
104. To date, more than half of the states have adopted UFTA. For a list ofjurisdictions that
have adopted UFTA, see CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 1, 6.07[2][a], at 6-160 n.128.
105. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 389 (1986).
106. See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988).
107. See Grissom v. Johnson, 955 F.2d 1440, 1449 (1lth Cir. 1992) (arguing that the multifactor analysis is the only way to provide adequate deference to state foreclosure procedures and
rights of secured creditors, without trammeling upon the statutory purpose of § 548).
108. Henry-Luqueer Properties, Inc. v. Mayo (In re Henry-Luqueer Properties, Inc.), 145
B.R 771, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (pointing out that the purpose is to foster an equitable

distribution of the debtor's property).
109. General Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 B.R. 124, 132 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1987).
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over, despite the emphasis on sale prices, even Durreetand its progeny
have in fact implicitly engaged in case-by-case analysis of all the rele-

vant facts. 110 This phenomenon further suggests the appropriateness
of the Bundles multi-factor analysis.
The multi-factor approach as formulated in Bundles, however,
merely lists some factors to be considered in determining reasonable
equivalency and fails to explicitly provide a definite controlling standard for considering those factors.1" Nevertheless, case law clearly
indicates that courts have adopted a commercial reasonableness stan112
dard, drawing an analogy to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
The basis for adopting the UCC standard by analogy is sound. First,
the UCC is the most uniform and enlightened modern state law on the
subject of commercial reasonableness. 1 3 It naturally becomes the best
candidate to harmonize state law and a federal reasonableness standard. 114 Second, the commercial reasonableness standard, unlike state
real estate foreclosure procedures, comports with the equity-protecting
purpose of section 548(a)(2) because a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale should achieve a price reasonably equivalent to the full
realizable market value and thereby preserves any market-determined
equity interest the debtor may have in the foreclosed property. Moreover, the Supreme Court recently, when faced with an insufficiently
defined term in a similar bankruptcy provision involving property
rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate, looked to the UCC for guidance in determining when a transfer was made by a check pay110. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980). The court
wrote, "[o]ur review of the entire evidence leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that the
price . . . was not a 'fair equivalent' for the property," strongly indicating that the court's
decision rested on all the facts rather than the price alone. See id. Durrett'sprogeny often make
their decisions in a similar fashion. See Ehrlich, supra note 69, at 963 n.89. Note that Durrett's
case-by-case factual analysis lacks a definite controlling standard.
111. See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988).
112. See GeneralIndus., 79 B.R. at 131-33; see also Grissom v. Johnson, 955 F.2d 1440, 1446
(11th Cir. 1992) (requiring foreclosing parties to take "all commercially reasonable steps" to
recover debtors' equity); Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824 (citing cases which have explicitly argued for
the standard); Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983, 990-91
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989).
113. GeneralIndut, 79 B.R. at 131, 132-33.
114. See id. at 133. But see Madrid I, 21 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (advocating
harmonization between state foreclosure procedures and the federal fraudulent conveyance law).
Note that the UCC foreclosure requirements are used for personalty and fixtures rather than
realty, but the distinction between personalty and realty is irrelevant for purpose of § 548(a)(2)
because Congress did not make the distinction in the fraudulent transfer provisions. The term
"transfer," as defined in the statute, includes both kinds of property. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 10 1(54)
(West 1993).
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ment.11 5 Therefore, absent a better standard, the UCC commercial
reasonableness standard should be the controlling standard for considering all the relevant factors under section 548(a)(2).
V.

BROADENING JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE
COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS OF
FORECLOSURE SALES

Courts currently applying the commercial reasonableness standard
have not taken full advantage of the relevant UCC provisions to
achieve the price-maximizing objective of section 548(a)(2). To date,
courts have limited their inquiry to public sales and have neglected
11 6
private channels as an important means of property disposition.
The UCC requires "every aspect of the disposition," including the
"method" of disposition, to be commercially reasonable.1 17 Choosing
a public sale in spite of higher private offers may be commercially
unreasonable, regardless of how well-run the public sale. 1 8 Thus,
courts should look beyond public sales and examine the methods of
disposition as an additional factor for determining the commercial reasonableness of foreclosure sales.
The UCC also speeifies as a commercially reasonable paradigm sales
conducted "in the usual manner in any recognized market" for the
type of collateral involved.1 1 9 Public sales are often not the usual
manner of selling property. For example, one would normally not
choose to sell one's home at a public sale since it will be extremely
difficult for public sales to achieve the highest realizable market values. 2 ° In cases involving partnership interests, the usual manner of
selling through commercial channels will almost certainly result in
higher prices for the collateral.121 Thus, federal courts should inquire
into sales efforts customary for the type of property involved as an
integral part of the inquiry into the promotion of public foreclosure
115. See Bamhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1389 (1992) (using the UCC to determine what
constitutes a transfer under § 547(b), the preference provision).
116. See, ag., Grissom, 955 F.2d at 1448; Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
939 F.2d 20, 26 (3d Cir. 1991); Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824; Lindsay, 98 B.R. at 992.
117. U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
118. See United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 250, 259 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding
commercially unreasonable a public sale for approximately $41,000 when the secured party had
two pre-auction private offers of $200,000 and $210,000).
119. UCC § 9-507(2).
120. See General Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 B.R. 124, 130 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1987).
121. See Thomas v. Price, 975 F.2d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 1992) (indicating that a private sale of
partnership interest through commercial channels was almost certain to result in higher
realization on the collateral).
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sales. Prospective buyers found through such efforts should be invited
to attend the foreclosure sales. This broadened inquiry can increase
competitive bidding and as a result better serve the price-maximizing
objective of section 548(a)(2).
As a practical matter, foreclosed properties are inherently not as
marketable as other properties due to the uncertainty in title and the
risks usually accompanying distressed properties; thus foreclosure
sales may never be able to achieve similar market prices. 122 This fact
is an additional reason for considering the usual conmercial practices
where market forces operate. The goal should not be to attain the full
appraised market value; it should be to attain a reasonably full realizable value, given the market conditions and the inherent downward
pressure of foreclosures. Since the market provides the best means of
determining value, the best way to determine the reasonably full realizable value is to let the property be tested fully by market forces. The
broadened inquiry allows such testing and provides in practice a better
means of ascertaining the true value of the foreclosed property.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite the widespread view that the 1984 Amendments have conclusively resolved the transfer issue, the equity-protecting effect of
state statutory redemption casts doubts on the validity of this view in
jurisdictions allowing post-foreclosure statutory right of redemption.
In these jurisdictions, one may plausibly argue that -three transfers are
at issue, and the third transfer upon expiration of the statutory
redemption period, rather than the second one at the foreclosure sale,
is the relevant transfer for purposes of section 548(a)(2). The threetransfer view, if adopted, can significantly impact actions brought
under section 548(a)(2) by preventing a trustee from bringing such an
action for up to a year or more. The transfer issue aside, of the three
divergent approaches to determining reasonable equivalency under
section 548(a)(2), the multi-factor analysis following the commercial
reasonableness approach of the UCC provides the most balanced
method for achieving the purpose of section 548(a)(2). However,
courts already applying the commercial reasonableness standard are
urged to broaden their inquiry to include customary sales efforts
through the usual channels as an integral part of their commercial
reasonableness analysis. This broadened inquiry can better serve the
122. See General Indus., 79 B.R. at 132.
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equity-protecting purpose of section 548(a)(2) by taking advantage of
market forces to help determine more accurately the true realizable
values of foreclosed properties.
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